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Over the last twenty years, there has been an increased interest 
in Hellenistic philosophy in general, and in Epicureanism in 
particular. One might infer from the title of this work that this is 
another study in the development of Epicureanism. However, this 
is not the case. Much of this work is a revision of Warren's 1999 
doctoral dissertation, and the purpose of the investigation is the 
philosophical background to the ethical theory of eudaimonistic 
hedonism proposed by Epicurus. When Warren mentions the 
"philosophical background" in his introduction, he should say that 
the focus of the work is on the philosophical background of the 
ethical theory proposed by Democritus and developed, allegedly, 
through a succession of different philosophers Warren claims are 
Democriteans. This succession terminates with Epicurus and his 
immediate followers. For the moment, I shall pass over comment 
on this alleged "succession" and make one general comment. There 
is little in this work that directly bears on Epicurus outside of a 
few general comments on the connection between Epicurus' notion 
of ataraxia and how Warren proposes this has been influenced by 
and finds its origin in the Democritean notion of euthymia. I find 
this surprising since Warren has written extensively on Epicurus.' 
What this text lacks is a chapter that lays out Warren ' s 
understanding of Epicurus' central ethical notions in order to tie 
together a number of the arguments Warren develops within the 
text. The addition of such a chapter would greatly enhance this 
study. However, in spite of this absence, there is a wealth of 
information useful in understanding Democritean ethics. For the 
remainder of this review, I shall focus on the relative merits and 
apparent defects of several of the chapter of this text. 
As stated in Warren's introduction, the purpose of his study is 
"to provide a full account of the philosophical tradition that links 
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these two men (Epicurus and Democritus). Warren cautions his 
readers that by describing his method an "archaeology" he risks 
recalling the Foucauldian "archaeologies". It is not his intention 
to use Michel Foucault's method, but in examining the succession 
of philosophers whom he sees link Democritus to Epicurus some 
excavation is in order. No complete texts have survived from either 
Democritus, Anaxarchus, Pyrrho, or Nausiphanes, nor, for that 
matter, do we possess any extended discussion on the topic of 
Ethics from Epicurus. 2 In their absence, one must investigate the 
"layers" of this tradition within the extent fragments. 
Warren, in the first chapter, attempts to identify who are the 
"Democriteans". Relying on a short discussion of the teacher-
student relationships from Diogenes Laertius, and modifying that 
account with information from St. Clement of Alexandria, Warren 
introduces the cast of characters to be discussed. Warren further 
relies on a passage from St. Clement, where he discussed the 
"Abderites" who identify the telos as: Democritus says the telos is 
euthymia, which he also terms euesto, Hecataeus says that it is 
autarkeia, Apollodotos of Cyzicuspsychagogia, Nausiphanes says 
akataplexia, which he claims is the same thing as what Democritus 
calls athambia. This lineage or linkage is untangled, and Warren 
ultimately argues that they are not the same thing. One thing strikes 
the reader, since this is the evidence ultimately used to support his 
thesis concerning the linkage from Democritus to Epicurus, one 
wonders why Warren does not do more to connect these concepts 
in this initial chapter so that he can anticipate the connections 
between these figures? While claiming that these figures form a 
teacher-student lineage, he also claims that each f igure 's 
identification of the telos is distinct. The reader is left wondering 
what exactly the connection between these figures is. Perhaps if 
Warren had spelled out the connection between these figures, the 
reader could grasp the connection between them. 
The second chapter, "Democr i tus ' ethics and atomist 
psychologies", I contend, is the best part of the book. After noting 
the difficulties in the surviving texts attributed to Democritus, 
Warren attempts to reconstruct the basic outline of Democritean 
ethics. Starting with the statement from Diogenes Laertius 9.45 
"All things happen by virtue of necessity, the vortex being the 
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cause of the creation of things, and this he calls necessity. The end 
of action is tranquillity (euthymia), which is not identical with 
pleasure, as some by a false interpretation have understood, but a 
state in which the soul continues calm and strong, undisturbed by 
any fear or superstition or any other emotion. This he calls well-
being (euesto) and many other names." 3 Here, Warren connects 
his discussion of Democritus with Epicurus' discussion of the telos, 
by noting that this sounds very much like ataraxia. The reader is 
cautioned that there is little in this chapter that directly bears on 
Epicurus, and only at a topical level does Warren connect these 
concerns of Democritus with those of Epicurus. 4 
The remainder of the chapter is an analysis of the longest 
surviving fragment of Democritus, B191. This fragment begins 
with "Euthymia arises in men through a moderation of joy (terpsios) 
and a good balance (symmetriei) in life. Deficiencies and excesses 
tend to change into one another and set up great motions in the 
soul. Souls moved out of large intervals are neither well settled 
nor euthymoi. Warren confirms that "Democritus is no full-blooded 
hedonist" because euthymia "depends on two 'moderations': a 
specific moderation of terpsis and a more general moderation of 
one's life". But, what is terpsis? Warren's contention is that terpsis 
is not the same thing as pleasure (hedone), and notes that there are 
fragments from Democritus that caution the identification of the 
good with pleasure. Warren suggests that we should understand 
terpsis as "joy" and to distinguish between joy and pleasure. 
Pleasure is the feeling one might have that is or is not beneficial, 
whereas joy is a feeling we can accept as objectively good. I have 
some reservations about this suggestion. In particular, Warren 
distances his interpretation of this important fragment from any 
physicalist interpretation. This is unfortunate. The passage does 
suggest that euthymia comes into existence though a moderation 
of joy (euthymia ginetai metrioteti terpsios). The notion of 
moderation is important here. Metriotes literally means a middle 
condition.5 Connecting the notion of a middle condition with joy, 
the passage suggests that there is a proper condition of the soul in 
which the telos comes into existence for human beings on account 
of a balanced life and a middle condition of joy. The second 
sentence of this fragment further elaborates what that middle 
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condition of joy consists in. Here, Democritus explains that 
deficiencies and excesses tend to change into one another and set 
up great motions in the soul. This results in souls being moved out 
of large intervals that are neither well settled nor euthymoi. If we 
follow Warren's earlier suggestion that euthymia anticipates 
Epicurus' notion of ataraxia, then euthymia is a state of the soul 
in the middle or well balanced condition. Further, the fragment 
suggests that the extreme conditions set up great motions within 
the soul that inhibit or prevent this condition from coming into 
existence. One further suggestion connecting Epicurus with 
Democritus is a passage from Epicurus' On the Telos. In this 
fragment, Epicurus states: For the well-balanced state of the flesh 
(to gar eustathes katastema tes sarkos) and the confident 
expectation about it (sic. the flesh) holds the greatest and most 
secure joy for those able to think (On the Telos: Usener: frag. 63. 
[trans. Pumnton]). This passage suggests that ataraxia comes into 
existence on account of the well-balanced state of the flesh and 
the confident expectation about this state that holds the greatest 
and most secure joy for men. Further, in Porphyry's On Abstinence, 
there is a passage that will be useful here. 
As for eating meat, it relieves neither any of our nature's stress 
nor a desire whose non-satisfaction would give rise to any pain. 
It involves a violent gratification (ten de charin biaian eiche) 
which is swiftly combined with its opposite. What it contributes 
to is not life's maintenance but variation of pleasures, just like 
sex or the drinking of exotic wines, all of which our nature is 
quite capable of doing without (Porphyry, On Abstinence: 1.51.6 
(Usener frag 464, part, [trans. Long and Sedley]). 
The language of this passage suggests that certain empty pleasures, 
e.g., eating meat, involve a violent gratification that is swiftly 
combined with its opposite. This movement from one gratification 
to another is reminiscent of the language found in B 191 concerning 
the excesses and deficiencies that set up great motions in the soul 
that prevent euthymia from coming into existence in men. This 
would suggest that the notions of pleasure and joy are more closely 
linked than Warren suggests. In lieu of Warren's analysis, I would 
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urge that this distinction in Democritus between terpsis and hedone 
anticipates Epicurus' distinction between joy (chard) and kinetic 
pleasure. 6 
I have one final comment on this chapter. By distancing himself 
from a phyisicalist interpretation of Democritus here, Warren is 
left defending a psychologicalist interpretation of pleasure and 
pain. This bars him from exploring some important connections 
between Democritus and the ancient Hippocritean materials. 
The remaining chapters of this text move further and further 
away from actual texts we possess from the ancient world into the 
realm of speculation. The chapters on Anaxarchus' moral stage 
and Hecateus of Abdera's instructive ethnography are of this nature. 
The chapter on Pyrrho and Timon: inhuman indifference, attempts 
to link Democritus' saying (B125) concerning the conventional 
designation of perceptibles with Pyrrho's scepticism. Starting with 
this Democritean reductionist claim concerning the nature of things, 
Warren links up a reported saying of Pyrrho that makes a related 
moral claim. "[Pyrrho] said that nothing was fine or foul or just or 
unjust, and generally for all things that nothing is in truth, but that 
men do everything through custom and habit." 71 find much in this 
chapter compelling, but I find Warren's suggestion that Pyrrho 
himself was not a sceptic to be unconvincing. 
My final comment concerns the chapter on Nausiphanes. It 
would be important and valuable to further explore this philosopher, 
because of his connection to Epicurus. 8 Clearly, from Diogenes 
Laertius report, Nausiphanes instructed Epicurus on the works of 
Democritus. Most of what we know of this shadowy figure comes 
from Diogenes Laertius report of him in connection to Epicurus 
as well as some fragments from Philodemus' work On Rhetoric. 
My problem with this chapter is that it relies too heavily on hostile 
reports of Nausiphanes. This is unfortunate, since this philosopher 
did not merit a section in Diogenes Laertius text.9 With the absence 
of any texts directly from Nausiphanes, one is left suspicious of 
the interpretation Warren makes of his doctrines. 
The final chapter of the text, a mere eight pages, is intended to 
draw together the connection between Democritus and Epicurus 
concerning the topics of Determinism, Scepticism, and Ethics. 
Unfortunately, Warren does not tell us how Epicurus' own view 
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grew out of Democritean ethics. The topics Warren does discuss, 
Epicurus' anti-determinism and anti-scepticism, are true enough. 
But, the reader is left puzzled why Warren did not elaborate why 
these positions that Epicurus held were important for attainment 
of the telos, or why these doctrines had to be rejected in order for 
philosophy to prepare one for experience of the telos. 
All in all, there are portions of this text that merit investigation 
and further scholarship. It is an uneven text, with sections that are 
firmly within the current scholarship, while others rest on 
speculation. 
Notes 
1 A small sampling of Warren's articles on Epicurus are: Warren, 
James. "Epicurus And The Pleasures Of The Future". Oxford Studies in 
Ancient Philosophy. Vol 21. 2001. p. 135-179. and Warren, James. 
"Epicurean Immorality". Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy. Vol 18. 
2000. p. 231-261. 
2 We do, however, possess a small summary of Epicurus' ethical 
views in the Letter to Menoeceus. This is our main surviving source 
from Epicurus of his ethical views. 
3 DL 9.45. Translated by R.D. Hicks. Note: Warren translates this 
passage somewhat differently. "He says that euthymia is the goal of life-
which is not identical with pleasure as some have mistakenly understood, 
but is the state in which the soul proceeds peacefully and well settled, 
disturbed by no fear or superstition or any other passion. He also calls 
this euesto and many other names. 
4 Some of the topical concerns that deserve more analysis are the 
removal of fear, superstition, and the removal of anxiety in order to attain 
the telos. 
5 LSJ sv. 
6 Jeffry Purrington makes a similar remark in his article "Epicurus 
on the Telos", Phronesis 38. 1993. p. 281-321. 
7 DL 9.61 
8 Diogenes Laertius reports that Epicurus was instructed by 
Nausiphanes and Praxiphanes (DL 10.13). 
9 The condition of Philodemus' On Rhetoric is in poor condition. 
Warren has done an admirable job collating the scattered comments 
Philodemus makes about Nausiphanes. One hopes that further discoveries 
at Herculaneum will reveal more about this important figure. 
